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CUSTOMS COURT REFORM
I. INTRODUCTION
The necessity for Customs Court reform arose as a result of inconsistent
case law emanating from courts with jurisdiction over import transactions.'
Varying interpretations of the law by the district courts and the Customs
Court (two systems of judicial review that were bound by different precedent)
created the need for Congressional intervention and reform.
Congress' primary objective was to create consistent judicial review of
import transactions.' Congress had recently increased its influence over trade
policy through the enactment of new trade laws; however, the provisions of
these laws are subject to judicial interpretation and influence. When judicial
decisions are inconsistent or unclear, Congress' trade policies are under-
mined.
Judicial review ensures that implementation of trade laws by agencies
charged with such duties conforms to Congressional objectives. Two recent
decisions of the Customs Court exemplify the influence of this court on trade
policy. The first case, Yoshida Int'l. Inc. v. United States, upheld a surcharge
on imports against attacks that the President had acted outside of his
statutory authority by authorizing the imposition of the surcharge.' The
second case, Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, held valid countervailing
duties imposed to counteract subsidies given by the Japanese government to
its producers.' Review by the Customs Court ensured that the agency (the
Customs Service in both examples) properly implemented the Congressional
policies underlying the statutes in levying these duties. In Yoshida, the court
found that Congress intended to give the President broad authority to impose
import surcharges in order to reduce the injurious impact of imports on
American industry. In Zenith, Congress authorized countervailing duties to
combat the Japanese government's subsidization of its domestic producers.
1. H.R. REP. No. 1235, 96th CONG., 2d SESS., 18-19 (1980), citing Customs Courts
Act of 1980, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Monopolies and Commercial Law of
the Committee on the Judiciary, H.R. 6394, 96th CONG., 2d SESS. 7 (1980).
2. H.R. REP. No. 1235, 96th CONG., 2d SESS. 18-19 (1980) (purpose).
3. Yoshida Int'l. Inc. v. United States, 378 F. Supp. 1155 (Cust. Ct. 1974), rev'd,
556 F.2d 560 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (countervailing duties imposed under section 201 of the
Trade Act challenged).
4. Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 430 F. Supp. 242 (Cust. Ct.), rev'd, 562
F.2d 1209 (C.C.P.A. 1977), aft'd, 437 U.S. 443 (1978). See also Customs Courts Act:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Comm. on
the Judiciary on S. 2857, 95th CONG., 2d SESS. 48 (1978).
(119)
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Judicial review of agency action under trade legislation operated very
ineffectively prior to the passage of the Customs Courts Act of 1980.' The
goal of the Customs Courts Act of 1980 was to improve the consistency of
judicial review of actions arising under trade legislation and to thereby
ensure proper implementation of trade policy.6 The Act was an attempt to
resolve the problem of overlapping jurisdictional grants to the Customs Court
and district courts by providing greater access to judicial review to those
persons aggrieved by agency actions affecting importation, and by expanding
the remedies available to aggrieved parties. This note discusses the three
major aspects of change in the judicial review of import transactions -
changes in jurisdiction, standing, and relief - in the Customs Courts Act of
1980.
A. APPROACH To REFORM'
In reviewing the provisions of the Act, it is first beneficial to note how
5. Customs Courts Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-417, 94 Stat. 1727 (1980) (amend-
ing 28 U.S.C. §§ 251, 1581-85, 2631-47 and technical and conforming amendments to
various sections of titles 18 and 19) [hereinafter cited as Customs Courts Act].
6. Clarification of jurisdiction was the overriding Congressional goal among
many, and the harm from unclear jurisdictional grants was the primary motivating
force for this statute. The intolerable confusion demanded reform so the judicial system
would be interpreting and implementing the law in one way. The other Congressional
goals were: (1) to ensure access to the Customs Court to those persons aggrieved by
agency action; (2) to complete the transfer of the Customs Court to an Article III court;
and (3) to achieve uniformity of imports as required by the Constitution. All of these
goals were expressed throughout the floor debates by the proponents of the bill and
shall be discussed throughout this note. See, e.g., 126 CONG. REC. S13344-45 (daily ed.
September 24, 1980) (remarks of Senator DeConcini); 126 CONG. REC. H9342 (daily ed.
September 22, 1980) (remarks of Rep. Rodino). See also Customs Courts Act of 1980,
Hearings on HIR 6394 Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the
Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th CONG., 2d SESS. 145-46 (1980) (statement of Leonard
Lehman, Chairman of the American Bar Association Standing Committee on Customs
Law, - statement enumerates the bill's objectives that were supported by the Amer-
ican Bar Association). For a compilation of legislative material on the Customs Courts
Act of 1980, see LAW & BusiNEss, INC., LITIGATION BEFORE THE U.S. COURT OF INTERNA-
TIONAL TRADE (1981).
7. In its reform of the process of judicial review of the Customs Court, the Act fits
within a broader policy objective of Congress in the late 1970s to reform the federal
judicial machinery. Omnibus Judgeship Act of 1978, 28 U.S.C. §§ 44-46 (Supp. II 1978)
(increased number of permanent circuit court judgeships); Federal District Court
Organization Act of 1978, 28 U.S.C. §§ 89-118 (Supp. IT 1978) (increased number of
permanent district court judgeships, reorganized and changed locations of places court
to be held); Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-458, 94 Stat. 2035 (1980) (to be codified in 28 U.S.C. § 331); Federal
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the Customs Courts Act of 1980 comports with the traditional pattern of
Congressional reform of the Customs Court. In the past, Congressional
reform of judicial review focused on the procedural deficiencies of such
review, as in the Customs Courts Act of 1970 and the Customs Procedural
Reform and Simplification Act of 1978.0 Both Acts responded to particular
procedural defects in the system of judicial review of agency action affecting
imports, and left the less pressing substantive problems of jurisdiction,
standing and remedies unresolved." Congress' approach was to reform the
Courts Improvement Act of 1979, S. 1477, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (proposed a
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit - failed to pass the Senate).
Commentators long argued for reform of the federal judicial system in its
totality and in regard to specific courts. E.g., Commission on Revision of the Federal
Court Appellate System, Structure and Internal Procedures: Recommendations for
Change, reprinted in 67 F.R.D. 195 (1975) (Hruska Commission); Advisory Council for
Appellate Justice, Recommendations for Improving the Federal Intermediate Appellate
System (1975); Federal Judicial Center, Report of the Study Group on the Caseload of
the Supreme Court (1972) (the Freund Committee).
The Administrative Conference of the United States completed a study of judi-
cial review of actions taken by the United States Customs Service in 1977, resulting in
Recommendation 77-2, which suggested certain changes in judicial review by the Cus-
toms Court, including, but not limited to, jurisdiction, standing, burden of proof, and
assessment of penalties. Recommendation 77:2: Judicial Review of Customs Service
Actions, as adopted by the Administrative Conference, may be found in Customs Courts
Act, Hearings on H.R. 6394 Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law
of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th CONG., 2d SESS. 241 (1980). See also Gerhart,
Judicial Review of Customs Service Actions, 9 LAW POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1101 (1977).
8. Customs Courts Act, supra note 5.
9. Customs Courts Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-271, 84 Stat. 274,(1970). This Act
generally addressed agency action by the Customs Service in the valuation and assess-
ment of duties and revised the process by which an importer protested and contested
duties imposed. Id. (codified in 19 U.S.C. §§ 1513-15 (1976)).
10. Customs Procedural Reform and Simplification Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-
410, 92 Stat. 888 (1978) (codified in diverse sections of title 28, chapter 19 of the United
States Code). This Act enacted the recommendations of the Administrative Conference
on civil penalty actions. 28 U.S.C. § 1592 (Supp. III 1979).
11. In 1970 and 1978, Congress was not presented with broad proposals meant to
establish a comprehensive system with expanded opportunities for judicial review of
agency actions affecting imports. Instead of removing the impediments to judicial re-
view, Congress simply reformed the internal operations of the Customs Court. H.R.
REP. No. 123, 96th CONG., 2d SEss. 18 (1980); Customs Courts Act: Hearing on S. 2857
Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Comm. on the
Judiciary, 95th CONG., 2d Sass. 67 (1978) (statement of Honorable Edward D. Re, Chief
Judge, U.S. Customs Court).
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immediate procedural defects and leave the substantive issues for later
legislation. 2
Congress approached the recent need to reform in the same fashion as it
had in the past - by affecting only narrow changes. It failed to design the
needed systems of judicial review that would anticipate and resolve
prospective problems. Although Congress intended this Act to resolve all
confusion, conflict and inequities, its intent did not materialize in the
provisions of the Act. 3
Importers advocate that Congress take a wider view in its reform of
judicial review of agency action since the importers' right to review is solely
defined by Congress in legislation and is not constitutionally granted.'" If
agency action impedes importation, only legislation can define the right of
importers to protest such action in court.'5 The importers assert that more
extensive Congressional reform should expand jurisdiction, standing and
remedies in court; thus, increasing opportunities for review. A brief
description of trade laws that define importers' rights of action follows.'6
12. Representative Rodino accurately described past Congressional action:
Many complex questions have been raised over the years concerning the jurisdic-
tion of the Customs Court, its scope of review and the type of relief the court may
award. Periodically, the Congress has examined these issues and has altered the
court's status, jurisdiction and powers in a manner intended to solve a specific
problem or to meet a specific need at a particular time.
126 CONG. REC. H9,314 (daily ed. September 22, 1980). See S. REP. No. 466, 96th CONG.,
1st. SESS. 2-3 (1979).
13. Congressional intent was to create a comprehensive system of judicial review.
Many gaps still exist in the system of review established by Congress, and this legisla-
tion is not the final cure envisioned by Congress. S. REP. No. 96-466, 96th CONG., 1st
SESS. 3 (1979); 126 CONG. REC. S13344 (daily ed. September 24, 1980) (remarks of Sena-
tor DeConcini); 126 CONG. REC. H9342 (daily ed. September 22, 1980) (remarks of Rep.
Rodino).
14. Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470, 492-94 (1904) (no individual has a
vested right to trade with foreign nations). If the importer has no right to import, the
violation of that right is not actionable, and for the right to be actionable, it must be
given and defined statutorily. The importer may object to actions impeding importation
only as the statute allows him to so object. See Canadian Tarpoly Co. v. United States
Int'l Trade Comm'n, No. 81-5 (C.C.P.A. 1981), reprinted in 15 CusT. B. & DEC., No. 9
(March 4, 1981) (citing Buttfield v. Stranaham, 192 U.S. 470, 493, 496 (1904)) (dis-
allowed collateral attack on agency action without scope of right of action defined in
statute).
15. In United States v. Sherman & Sons Co., 237 U.S. 146, 152 (1915), the Court
stated that the right of review in the Customs Court is not an appeal in the ordinary
course of law. The right to appeal could only be exercised in "the statutory method, or
statutory conditions before special tribunals of limited jurisdiction."
16. See generally G. BRYAN, TAXING UNFAIR INTERNATIONAL TRADE PRACTICES
(1980).
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B. BACKGROUND OF TRADE LEGISLATION
As foreign trade has become more important to the domestic economy,'7
the right to contest agency action has expanded. Beginning with the Tariff
Act of 1930,1 trade legislation has become more than a means of collecting
revenue - it has become a means by which Congress can manipulate trade
policy. The three legislative acts that have most significantly influenced
trade policy are The Tariff Act of 1930,'" The Trade Act of 1974,0 and the
Trade Agreements Act of 1979.21
The Tariff Act of 1930 was the first modern major tariff legislation. It
established tariff rates" and defined the exact procedures for an importer to
follow in order to recover excessive duties." The Tariff Act was the basic
trade legislation authorizing the imposition and enforcement of duties.
17. In quantitative terms, the increased importance is very easy to illustrate. In
1970, imports into the United States amounted to $42.2 billion. In 1977, the figure
increased by 246 percent to $246.8 billion. Not only the volume of imports has in-
creased, but the ratio of imports as a percentage of the United States gross national
product has increased from 4.3 percent to 7.8 percent. This growth has spawned an
increased demand for the quick, orderly resolution of issues and disputes relating to
imports. Customs Courts Act of 1980: Hearing on S. 2857 Before the Subcomm. on
Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th CONG., 2d
SEss. 77-78 (1978) (statistics quoted by Thaddeus Royek, Chief Counsel, United States
Customs Service).
18. Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1202-1701 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
19. Id.
20. Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2487 (1976, Supp. 11 1978 & Supp. III
1979).
21. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 300 (1979).
22. Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1202 (1976, Supp. II 1978 & Supp. III 1979).
Beginning in 1979, the tariff schedules are no longer published in the United States
Code but are available in a separate document maintained by the United States Inter-
national Trade Commission. These tariff schedules contain descriptions of articles for
classification and appraisement and applicable quotas. See the Note on Publication of
Tariff Schedules preceding 19 U.S.C. § 1209 (Supp. I1 1979).
23. Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. 99 1513-16 (1976 & Supp. II 1979). As a con-
dition to judicial review of import determinations, administrative remedies must have
been exhausted. This process required the entry of the goods into the United States, the
assessment and liquidation of duties, and the payment of the duties. If the importer
disagreed with the Customs Service's determination, he filed a protest with the Cus-
toms Service. After the Customs Service reviewed and denied the protest, the importer
was required to file a summons and complaint before judicial review in the Customs
Court. 19 U.S.C. § 1484 (entry of merchandise); id. § 1500 (appraisement, classification,
and liquidation procedure); id. § 1514 (Supp. III 1979) (protest against decision of
appropriate customs' officer); id. § 1515 (1976 & Supp. III 1979) (review of protests,
administrative review, and modification of decisions); id. § 1516 (Supp. III 1979) (peti-
tions by domestic interested parties); id. § 1516a (judicial review in antidumping duty
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The Trade Act of 19744 was the second major piece of legislation. As
tariffs were reduced over the years, sectors of the American economy, hurt by
foreign competition, sought relief from reduced trade barriers. The Trade Act
of 1974 provided relief for workers, firms and communities injured by
increased import competition. If a worker lost his job, a firm went out of
business, or a community as a whole suffered because increased imports were
replacing the American-produced goods, the workers, firms and communities
were now able to qualify for financial assistance." This financial assistance
could be spent to train workers for new jobs, make production more efficient,
attract new industry to the community or otherwise counteract foreign
import competition. The Act gave Congress greater freedom to reduce trade
barriers because any American interest harmed as a result of reduced tariffs
could now receive assistance to mitigate the adverse effects of increased
import competition.
The Trade Agreements Act of 19796 amended both the Tariff Act of 1930
and the Trade Act of 1974. Congress enacted it" to implement the resolutions
of the Tokyo Round of Multinational Trade Negotiations, which were aimed
at reducing trade barriers. The Act attempted to reform judicial review,18
however, its haphazard approach left more meaningful reforms to be made by
the Customs Courts Act of 1980.
proceedings - similar procedure as for review of denial of protest). See also Customs
Courts Act of 1980: Hearings on H-R. 6394 Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and
Commercial Law of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th CONG., 2d SESS. 113-15 (1980).
24. Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2487 (1976, Supp. 11 1978 & Supp. III
1979).
25. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2273, 2341, 2371 (1976, Supp. II 1978 & Supp. III 1979).
26. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (1979) (codified
in titles 19 and 28 of the United States Code).
27. The major goals of the 1979 Act were: (1) to further international trade; and
(2) to improve the rules of international trade and the enforcement of such rules. 19
U.S.C. § 2502 (Supp. III 1979) (Congressional Statement of Purposes).
Z8. The Act expanded the opportunity for judicial review in countervailing duty
and antidumping duty proceedings and delegated review to the Customs Court along
with very limited injunctive powers. Although it increased judicial review and margi-
nally increased the powers of the Customs Court, the Trade Agreements Act of 1979
contained three defects. First, the Act did not set forth procedures and time limits
necessary for commencement of civil actions in the Customs Court contesting agency
determinations regarding countervailing and antidumping duties. Secondly, the Act
failed to sufficiently expand standing in the Customs Court, and finally, it did not
eliminate the confusion and inequities that had arisen in the case law due to the Cus-
toms Court's narrow jurisdiction. Extensive reform of the Customs Court was left for
subsequent legislation. Trade Agreements Act, 19 U.S.C. § 1516a (Supp. III 1979). See
H.R. REP. No. 96-1235, 96 CONG., 2d SESS. 20 (1980).
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Congress shapes trade policy through legislation rather than deferring
all authority over foreign trade to the executive branch.29 While the trend is
toward greater freedom of trade, Congress does not advocate the immediate
and complete abandonment of trade barriers. Implicit in trade legislation is a
careful balance between free trade and protectionism. The interest of
Congress is to ensure that the balance struck is reflected by agency and
judicial decisions. To ensure consistent interpretation of trade laws, Congress
vested jurisdiction over all trade actions in the Customs Court and changed
its name from the Customs Court to the Court of International Trade in order
to better reflect its expanded jurisdiction over trade actions."
II. THE ACT
The Customs Courts Act of 1980 expanded the jurisdiction of the United
States Customs Court and renamed it the United States Court of Interna-
tional Trade." This, in turn, necessitated a modification of the court's
procedure.2 The three most important changes in the law that will be
discussed are the expanded jurisdiction of the Court, the greater number of
persons who may now seek judicial review of agency actions concerning
trade, and the expanded remedies that the Court now has as its disposal to
relieve aggrieved parties.
A. JURISDICTION
The pressing need to clarify the jurisdiction of the Customs Court and of
the district courts justified immediate reform. Prior to the Act, overlapping
statutes and conflicting case law gave jurisdiction to both the Customs Court
and the district courts. Whether a case was within the Customs Court's
29. Congress has the power to regulate foreign commerce while the President has
authority to conduct foreign relations. Although the Congress often delegates to the
President the power to negotiate trade agreements, most international trade agree-
ments are adopted by Congress in the form of domestic legislation. U.S. CONST. arts. I,
§ 8 and II, §2. See Consumers Union, Inc. v. Kissinger, 506 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 1004 (1975) (discussion of scope of Presidential authority).
30. Congress changed the name of the Customs Court to the Court of International
Trade. The reason stated was "[t]he new name more accurately describes the court's
clarified and expanded jurisdiction and its new judicial functions relating to interna-
tional trade." H.R. REP. No. 96-1235, 96th CONG., 2d SEsS. 20 (1980). See Customs
Courts Act, supra note 5, at 1727 (to be codified in 28 U.S.C. § 251).
31. Customs Courts Act, supra note 5, at 1728 (to be codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1581).
32. Customs Courts Act, supra note 5, at 1730-37 (to be codified in 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2631-2642). A recent symposium, the transcript of which has been published, ex-
plained the practical workings of the statute. International Trade Symposium, 26
N.Y.L. Sca. L. REV. 431-504 (1981).
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jurisdiction or within a district court's jurisdiction was difficult to
determine."
Once any action was within the jurisdiction of the Customs Court, it was
supposed to be within the Customs Court's exclusive jurisdiction;34 the district
court was thereby precluded from taking jurisdiction.35 The problem arose in
trying to define exclusive jurisdiction. If a plaintiff chose a district court
within which to bring an action, and the district court ruled that the case was
properly within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Customs Court, the district
court dismissed the case. When trying to ascertain how the district courts
interpreted "exclusive," however, a party was confronted by conflicting case
law based on and distinguished by minute factual details and differences.
The typical scenario involved an importer who wished to import goods
into the United States, but refused to do so because of the duties that would
be imposed on the goods. These duties included the anti-dumping duty
(imposed for selling goods below fair market value);" the countervailing duty
(imposed because the foreign government of the importer provided a subsidy
33. See infra note 36.
34. Congress amended the Customs Court's jurisdiction based on the authority of
Patchogue-Plymouth Mills Corp. v. Duming, 101 F.2d 41 (2d Cir. 1947) and David L.
Moss Co., Inc. v. United States, 103 F.2d 395 (C.C.P.A. 1939) by adding the word "ex-
clusive" before "jurisdiction" in the statute. See Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat.
943, as amended by the Customs Court Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 92-271, tit. I, § 110. 84
Stat. 278 and the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, tit. x,
§ 1001(b)(4)(B), 93 Stat. 305 (amended in full by Customs Courts Act of 1980, supra
note 5, at 1728-32).
35. 28 U.S.C. § 1340 (1976). The statute reads:
The district courts shall have the original jurisdiction of any civil action arising
under any Act of Congress providing for internal revenue, or revenue from im-
ports or tonnage, except matters within the jurisdiction of the Customs Court.
36. The reason jurisdiction was so difficult to determine is because the decisions
rendered by the courts did not present a coherent body of law. The conflicts in the case
law were well-illustrated in district court and Court of Appeals decisions dismissing
and granting jurisdiction. The courts often strained to factually distinguish seemingly
identical cases. Compare Sneaker Circus v. Carter, 566 F.2d 396, 399-400 (2d Cir.
1977) (case will never ripen sufficiently to meet statutory requirements - district
court granted jurisdiction); and Davis Walker Corp. v. Blumenthal, 460 F. Supp. 283,
290 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (granted jurisdiction although requirements for review in Customs
Court not met); with Riconini v. United States, 69 F.2d 480, 482 (9th Cir. 1934) (pay-
ment of duties conceded jurisdiction of Customs Court - dismissal from district court);
and J.C. Penney Co. v. Dep't of the Treasury, 319 F. Supp. 1023, 1029 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd
439 F.2d 63, 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869 (1970) (the fact that the controversy
was not ripe for review did not deprive the Customs Court of exclusive jurisdiction -
district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction).
37. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673, 1673a-1673i (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
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to aid in the production of the goods);38 the import restraint duty (imposed
because the import quota for the goods had already been filled for the year);9
and finally, simple import duties. 0 Such an importer would never bring the
goods into the United States because he considered the duties that would be
imposed too excessive to allow for profit." If the goods never entered the
United States and a customs official never assessed duties on the goods, the
importer could not protest the duty, and the Customs Service, therefore,
could not deny the protest. Without a denied protest, the importer could
never bring the only action over which the Customs Court had jurisdiction -
an action to contest the denial of a protest against duties already assessed
and paid.2 This onerous barrier to challenging import duties in the Customs
Court presented the importer with the dilemma of either importing goods and
risking a loss, or not importing at all.
Another alternative sometimes existed for the importer who desired to
contest potential action by the Customs Service without importing the goods
and risking an adverse decision with the resulting profit-destroying duties.
Such an importer would not import goods unless the probable duties could be
successfully challenged beforehand. As a result, he would not be able to
follow the mandatory procedure for review in the Customs Court that
required importation of the goods.'3 Fortunately, some district courts lessened
38. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1303, 1671, 1671a-1671f (1976 & Supp. III 1979). See also 19
U.S.C. §§ 1516a (1976 & Supp. III 1979) (judicial review over imposition of countervail-
ing and antidumping duties).
39. 19 U.S.C. § 2253 (Supp. II 1978) (tariff-rate quota).
40. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1481-1510 (1976 & Supp. I1 1979) (ascertainment and collection
of duties). See also 19 U.S.C. §§ 1514-16 (1976 & Supp. III 1979) (recovery of excessive
duties).
41. Many times the rate of duty was so high that a plaintiff would be forced out of
business if he brought the goods into the United States and tried to sell it at a price
high enough to recoup the duty paid on it. In these cases, it was very improbable that
the plaintiff would petition for the adequate remedy at law. He would simply not im-
port the goods. See, e.g., Jerlian Watch Co. v. Dep't of Commerce, 597 U.S. 687, 690
(9th Cir. 1979); Horton v. Humphrey, 146 F. Supp. 819, 821 (D.C. Cir.), aff'd, 352 U.S.
921 (1956).
42. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1514-1516a (1976 & Supp. III 1979) (method of obtaining judicial
review in the Customs Court).
43. The action was not ripe until all available administrative remedies had been
pursued. If the action was not ripe, the Customs Court would not take jurisdiction, and
the district court would dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the sub-
ject matter of the case was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Customs Court. See,
e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Dep't of the Treasury, 485 F.2d 1402, 1403
(C.C.P.A. 1973) (jurisdiction not properly invoked under the statute, case not ripe, dis-
missed); J.C. Penney Co. v. Dep't of the Treasury, 439 F.2d 63, 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 869 (1970) (case dismissed - when ripe must then be reviewed in Customs
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the inequities resulting from this mandatory procedure for review by
granting jurisdiction based on a judicially-created exception to the otherwise
exclusive jurisdiction of the Customs Court.
These district courts held that no adequate remedy existed in the
Customs Court since the Customs Court would not take jurisdiction in these
cases, and that the cases were, therefore, not within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Customs Court. On this basis, the district courts held that they were
free to exercise jurisdiction." In Sneaker Circus v. Carter,45 the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit exercised this court-made exception and
granted jurisdiction and the injunctive relief sought by the aggrieved parties.
The court held that it was very unlikely that the importer would ever file a
preliminary protest contesting quota restraints on Korean athletic footwear.
As a result, the import restrictions would be enforced in the foreign port and
importation would never occur.48 This judicial exception to the Customs
Court's exclusive jurisdiction was viewed by many district courts as a relief
measure that avoided the inherent inequities of the statutory scheme.
Other district courts, however, interpreted the exclusivity of Customs
Court jurisdiction more literally. 7 Sensitive to the possible abuse and
Court); Morgantown Glassware Guild Inc. v. Humphrey, 236 F.2d 670, 671 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 352 U.S. 896 (1956) (prescribed administrative remedy must be exhausted)
Patchogue-Plymouth Mills Corp. v.. Durning, 101 F.2d 41, 44 (2d Cir. 1939) (dismissed
- must file protest and seek review in the Customs Court).
44. E.g., Sneaker Circus v. Carter, 566 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1977) (trade agreements
regulated at foreign port made it unlikely a protest would be filed in the United
States); Davis Walker Corp. v. Blumenthal, 460 F. Supp. 283, 290 (D.D.C. 1978) (strong
likelihood plaintiffs would not obtain review in Customs Court because foreign sup-
pliers would not sell below trigger price to cause an investigation to be initiated).
Accord, SCM Corp. v. Int'l Trade Comm., 549 F.2d 812 (1977); Timken Co. v. Simon,
539 F.2d 221 (D.C. Cir. 1976). But see Jerliah Watch Co. v. Dep't of Commerce, 597
F.2d 687, 692 (9th Cir. 1979) (financial barrier irrelevant consideration); J.C. Penney
Co. v. Dep't of the Treasury, 439 F.2d 63, 68 (2d Cir), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869 (1970)
(more desirable remedy in district court does not mean inadequate remedy in Customs
Court).
45. 566 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1977).
46. Id. at 401.
47. If a district court dismissed the case, the plaintiff's only alternative was to
seek review in the Customs Court and follow the statutory procedures requiring im-
portation, payment of duties, and finally, the challenge to the agency action. Cf. Flint-
kote Co. v. Blumenthal, 596 F.2d 51, 54-55 (1979) (lack of injunctive relief in Customs
Court not within inadequate remedy exception); J.C. Penney Co. v. Dep't of the Treas-
ury, 319 F. Supp. 1023 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd 439 F.2d 63, 65 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
869 (1970); Horton v. Humphrey, 146 F. Supp. 819 (D.C. Cir.). aff'd, 352 U.S. 921
(1956) (case dismissed because adequate remedy to import goods, pay antidumping
duty, and then protest the duty).
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manipulation of the inadequate remedy exception explained above, these
courts held that the mere lack of injunctive relief or any equitable remedy
prior to importation in the Customs Court did not mean that there was an
inadequate remedy. 8 The courts dismissed cases on the grounds that
exclusive jurisdiction meant that all cases involving evaluation and imposi-
tion of duties were to be in the Customs Court - regardless of the
remoteness of any remedy.49
This split in the case law prompted Congress to clarify the law in support
of the preference for consistent precedent and the constitutional mandate
that import duties be uniform."0 If the amount of the duty depended on the
district of importation, duties were not being uniformly imposed."
The Customs Courts Act, in an effort to eliminate the inconclusive case
law and the unfairness of inconsistent treatment, conferred exclusive
subject-matter jurisdiction over imports to the Court of International Trade
in the following broad language:
[Tihe Court of International Trade shall have exclusive jurisdiction of
any civil action .. .that arises out of any law of the United States
providing for-
(1) revenue from imports or tonnage;
48. Some district courts made it very clear they were going to follow the intent of
Congress to have a complete, integral system of customs laws and justice in the Cus-
toms Court. E.g., J.C. Penney Co. v. Dep't of the Treasury, 319 F. Supp. 1023
(S.D.N.Y.), afrd, 439 F.2d 63, 66 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869 (1970). See infra
note 49.
49. These district courts dismissed cases properly within Customs Court jurisdic-
tion so as not to undermine Congressional intent to have all import decisions in the
Customs Court, as was evidenced by the addition of the word "exclusive" to the statute.
Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 943 See supra note 34. See, e.g., Jerlian Watch
Co. v. Dep't of Commerce, 597 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1979) (adequate remedy to import in
excess of quota, pay duty, and protest - distinguished Sneaker); SCM Corp. v. Int'l
Trade Commn, 549 F.2d 812, 821 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Customs Court should be given
chance to determine if case within its exclusive jurisdiction); J.C. Penney Co. v. Dep't
of the Treasury, 319 F. Supp. 1023 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 439 F.2d 63, 66 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 869 (1970) (proper administration of customs laws requires a com-
plete, integral system of customs laws justice); Cottman Co. v. Dailey, 94 F.2d 85, 88
(4th Cir. 1938) (dismissed - Congress placed comprehensive system of review in Cus-
toms Court).
50. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. The exact language is as follows: "Imports and
excises shall be uniform throughout the United States."
51. Court decisions state that a tax is uniform if it operates with the same force
and effect in every place where the subject of the tax is found. This requirement is not
met if the enforcement of a duty can be more easily circumvented in some districts
than in others. See Billings v. United States, 232 U.S. 261 (1914); Head Money Cases,
112 U.S. 596 (1884); C.S. Taver & Sons v. United States, 135 F. Supp 874 (Cust. Ct.
1955).
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(2) tariffs, duties, fees, or other taxes on the importation of
merchandise for reasons other than the raising of revenue;
(3) embargoes or other quantitative restrictions on the importa-
tion of merchandise for reasons other than the protection of the
public health or safety; or
(4) administration and enforcement with respect to matters
[already within the jurisdiction of the court]. 2
In addition, the Act specifically transferred civil actions commenced under
the Trade Act of 1974, to the Court of International Trade. These civil actions
reviewed agency action on brokers' licenses, and challenged rulings pertain-
ing to the justification for countervailing and anti-dumping duties made by
the Secretary of the Treasury prior to importation.3
Although the problems the Act sought to rectify were clear and the
statutory language was thought to be precise, resulting conflicts in inter-
pretation have negated any Congressional hope for complete clarity in the
Act.
In framing the language of the bill, Congress could have chosen a specific
listing of all actions or statutes affecting imports, or a sweeping grant of
jurisdiction over all actions affecting imports. In previously proposed bills,
exclusive jurisdiction was vested in the court over all "civil actions .. .
directly affecting imports."' The bills then excluded certain actions from that
otherwise all-encompassing grant.' This grant in the earlier bills contrasts
sharply with that of the Customs Courts Act of 1980, which specifically
enumerates all the possible civil actions affecting imports, without exception,
as properly within the court's jurisdiction.'
In drafting the Act, some concern was expressed about the possible
ambiguity created by the failure to list specific statutes, which might
52. Customs Courts Act, supra note 5, at 1739 (to be codified in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1581(i)). See also Cohen, The "Residual Jurisdiction" of the Court of International
Trade Under the Customs Courts Act of 1980, 26 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 471 (1981) (gener-
al explanation of expanded jurisdiction).
53. Customs Courts Act, supra note 5, at 1728-29 (to be codified in 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1581(d), (g), (h)).
54. S. 2857, 95th CONG., 2d SESS., § 302 (1978).
55. Id. The exclusions from jurisdiction totaled seven and included actions arising
under antitrust laws, actions under the Shipping Act of 1916, actions concerning labor,
actions under the Freedom of Information Act or the Privacy Act, actions concerning
obscene material, actions involving a function vested by law in the Department of
Energy, and actions brought to review a discretionary decision of the President or in-
ternal advice issued by the Secretary of the Treasury.
56. Customs Courts Act, supra note 5, at 1729 (to be codified in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1581(i)).
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arguably have resulted in the inadvertent omission of a statute or action. In
response to these concerns, the House of Representatives Subcommittee on
Trade recommended a "generic approach rather than a specific listing of
statutes in an effort to provide greater protection for the rights of persons
involved in disputes arising out of import transactions."57 The Act, therefore,
sets forth broad categories of jurisdiction with the intent that the court
should liberally construe them in order to avoid the injustices encountered by
prior legislation.58
By listing in the Act only those civil actions within the jurisdiction of the
court, questions inevitably arose concerning the proper forum for those
actions not listed. An example of this confusion is Alberta Gas Chemicals,
Ltd. v. Celanese Corp.9 In Alberta, the district court, and later the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, took jurisdiction over a business tort issue
concerning imports.60 While these two courts were deciding particular
issues,5 another action involving the same imported merchandise and parties
was stayed in the Court of International Trade.2 Such multiple litigation in
three different courts could have been avoided had the Act given the Court of
International Trade sweeping jurisdiction over all actions concerning im-
ports. This would have placed all import actions in one court, and the
inconsistency in decisions and confusion as to the proper forum for any
particular cause of action involving imports could have been eliminated.
In contrast, other recent decisions have demonstrated the Court of
International Trade's ability to work within the limits of the Act and fulfill
Congress' intent that the grant of jurisdiction be given broad judicial
application in order to eliminate the prior jurisdictional conflicts between the
courts. In Di Jub Leasing v. United States' and Zenith Radio Corp. v. United
57. H.R. REP. No. 1235, 96th CONG., 2d SEss. 34 (1980).
58. The intent of Congress in its effort to avoid omission of any one statute was to
provide greater protection for the rights of persons involved in disputes arising out of
import transactions. Id.
59. No. 80-9021 (2d Cir. May 12, 1981).
60. Id. The plaintiff alleged tortious interference with a business opportunity. De-
fendant had allegedly presented false testimony before the International Trade Com-
mission that had caused an injury finding and consequentially higher duties on
plaintiff's imported goods.
61. The case was remanded to the International Trade Commission for a deter-
mination of whether perjury had, in fact, been committed. Id.
62. The action pending in the Court of International Trade was the review of the
Secretary of the Treasury's decision to impose the antidumping duty. Id.
63. No. 80-9 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1980), reprinted in 14 Cus r. B. & DEc. No. 15 (De-
cember 31, 1980).
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States,6 the court took jurisdiction over two actions not specifically listed in
the statute, but which were actions arising under the import laws.
In Di Jub Leasing, the court held that the Congressional intent to
establish a comprehensive system of review over a broad spectrum of
administrative trade actions mandated that the court review actions
concerning the suspension or revocation of various customs licenses. In Di
Jub Leasing, the court considered the revocation of a cartman's license.
65
In Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, the court discovered yet another
law meant by Congress to be included in those over which it has jurisdiction:
the provision of the Tariff Act of 1930 that allows for settlement by the
government of anti-dumping cases against foreign importers.' The plaintiff,
Zenith Radio, asserted that such a settlement was not authorized by the
statute. The court exercised jurisdiction, found for Zenith, and issued a
preliminary injunction that prohibited the government from settling the
case.67
Although the court has shown great initiative in exercising its broad
grant of review, explicit indications in the legislative history' and in the Act
itself, inhibit complete expansion of the court's jurisdiction. The undesirable
result is that district courts will be forced to take jurisdiction over most civil
actions not definitively within the Court of International Trade's exclusive
jurisdiction. These exclusions create further potential for confusion and
inconsistency as cases involving imports are necessarily bifurcated. Depend-
ing on the statute under which the action is brought, jurisdiction over certain
issues could remain in a district court while the rest of the issues in the case
might be heard in the Court of International Trade.
Congress implicitly excluded certain preliminary actions from the court's
jurisdiction. Congress did not want plaintiffs using the broad grant of
64. No. 80-10 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1980), reprinted in 15 CUST. B. & DEC. No. 1 (Janu-
ary 7, 1981).
65. No. 80-9 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1980), supra note 63. A cartman moves merchandise
between official Customs Service warehouses and is licensed by the Customs Service to
conduct such a trucking business for the Customs Service.
66. See Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1617 (1976). If the attorney handling the
claim by the government for the antidumping duties feels that the terms of the claim
and the probabilities of recovery might be compromised, the attorney may settle the
claim.
67. No. 80-10 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1980), reprinted in 15 CoST. B. & DEC. No. 1 (Janu-
ary 7, 1981).
68. See, e.g., .R. REP. No. 1235, 96th CONG., 2d SESS. 33-34 (1980) (use of the
word "involve" in jurisdiction section too broad); S. REP. No. 466, 96th CONG., Ist SEss.
10 (1979) (requirement that legislation out of which action arises directly and substan-
tially involve international trade).
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jurisdiction to circumvent other more specific and express grants of
jurisdiction in the Act, and thereby, nullify preliminary procedures of review
under the specific grants. If there was an express grant of jurisdiction in the
Act, it was Congress' intent that the plaintiff claim jurisdiction under that
express grant. 9 Using this interpretation, the court has held that the design
of Section 516(a) of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 prevailed over the
broader grant of jurisdiction in the Customs Courts Act of 1980.10 The court
would not review the preliminary determination made by the Secretary of
the Treasury that critical circumstances did not exist to warrant the
imposition of anti-dumping duties. The court said that only final determina-
tions by the Secretary would be reviewable.7' The broad grant of jurisdiction
in the Customs Courts Act of 1980 cannot be used to circumvent the intent of
the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 not to provide such preliminary review.
72
Furthermore, the explicit grant of jurisdiction in the Customs Courts Act
over anti-dumping determinations by the Secretary of the Treasury does not
state that preliminary determinations may be reviewed by the court.73
In most instances, Congress stated more expressly those actions to be
excluded from the court's jurisdiction. The Act prohibits the court from
taking jurisdiction over actions arising out of laws providing for quantitative
restrictions on the importation of merchandise that may be hazardous to the
69. Congress did not intend that Section (i) (in particular paragraph 4, the broad
grant) be utilized to circumvent the exclusive method of judicial review of those anti-
dumping and countervailing duties listed in Section 516a of the Tariff Act of 1930.
Strong legislative history precludes the court from expanding its jurisdiction over in-
terim decisions preceding the final determinations listed in Section 516a of the Tariff
Act or any other determination specified in Section 516a - any preliminary adminis-
trative action that will be incorporated or superseded by such determination is review-
able exclusively as provided in Section 516a. A preliminary affirmative or negative
antidumping or countervailing duty determination is reviewable only in connection
with the review of the final determination by the administering authority. H.R. REP.
No. 96-1235, 96th CONC., 2d SESS. 48 (1980); S. REP. No. 6-466, 96th CONG., 1st SESS.
10-11 (1979). See also infra note 81.
70. Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, No. 80-10 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1980), re-
printed in 15 CUsT. B. & DEC. No. 1 (January 7, 1981). Accord, Haarman & Reimer
Corp. v. United States, No. 81-13 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1980), reprinted in 15 CUsT. B. &
DEC. No. 9 (March 4, 1981).
71. Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, No. 80-10 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1980), re-
printed in 15 CUST. B. & DEC. No. 1 (Jan. 7, 1981).
72. Generally only final determinations relating to antidumping duty and coun-
tervailing duty proceedings are reviewable. See Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 19
U.S.C. § 1516a(2)(b) (Supp. III 1979) (reviewable determinations listed).
73. Customs Courts Act, supra note 5, at 1728 (to be codified in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1581(c)).
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public health or safety7" and over civil actions filed to determine whether or
not goods imported into the United States are obscene. 5
Not all cases involve a single fact pattern that fits squarely within either
the jurisdiction of the Court of International Trade or the jurisdiction of the
district court. For example, an embargo may be imposed for a multitude of
reasons, and the determination of those reasons may depend not only upon
objective guidelines, but upon the initial forum in which the case is brought
or upon factual distinctions. Although the few exclusions from the court's
jurisdiction over which the district courts might take jurisdiction seem easy
to delineate, problems in interpretation suggest that the two forums might
easily disagree on the question of which court should take jurisdiction. In
order to pursue its goal of creating a comprehensive system of judicial review
over all import transactions, Congress should have included these excluded
actions in the Court of International Trade's statutory grant of jurisdiction.
Overriding policy reasons persuaded Congress to omit the excluded
actions. Because laws for the protection of the public health and safety affect
both domestic and foreign industry, it was considered to be in the public
interest that only one system of judicial review implement health and safety
laws. It was determined that there should not be two bodies of laws - one in
the Court of International Trade for foreign producers and one in the district
74. Customs Courts Act, supra note 5, at 1729 (to be codified in 28 U.S.C.
1581(i)(3)). Customs Service administers a variety of laws that do not involve questions
of classification, valuation, or rates of duty, but involve questions of the public health
and safety. Cases arising under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act and the
Toxic Substances Act, which exclude hazardous goods from the United States, usually
do not involve trade issues for which the Customs Court has a developed expertise.
Consequentially, Congress decided that the disadvantages of transferring jurisdiction
from the district courts to the Customs Court outweighed the advantages and left juris-
diction in the district courts for those cases concerning both the public welfare and
imports. See Gehart, Judicial Review of Customs Service Actions, 9 LAW & POL'Y INT'L
Bus. 1101, 1159 (1977). See, e.g., Precise Imports Corp. v. Kelly, 378 F.2d 1014, 1016
(2d Cir. 1967) (district court took jurisdiction to decide if imported knives fell within
the Switchblade Knife Act which prohibits transportation and distribution of switch-
blade knives - not a customs law).
75. Customs Courts Act, supra note 5, at 1729 (to be codified in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1581(i)). This section excludes from the jurisdiction of the Court all actions brought
under Section 305 of the Tariff Act of 1930 which prohibits the importation of immoral
articles into the United States. The term immoral articles is defined as any written or
printed matter advocating insurrection or forcible resistance to any law or containing
any threat to take the life of or inflict bodily harm upon any person, any obscene book
or other representation, any drug causing unlawful action, or finally any printed paper
that may be used as a lottery ticket. Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1305 (1976).
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courts for domestic producers." This argument ignores the resulting blurred
jurisdictional lines and the resulting diverse treatment of similar imports
that depends upon the district in which the good is originally imported. If
cases involve imports, they should be heard by the Court of International
Trade so that the system of judicial review will harmonize with Congress'
original intentions of having both an integral system of review over import
transactions and a uniform body of import law.
Similar arguments compel the conclusion that review over the importa-
tion of obscene material should rest with the Court of International Trade.
The correct standard to determine whether or not such material is offensive
is a national community standard that would be more consistently prom-
ulgated by the Court of International Trade than by the many district
courts.' The Act also empowers the court to empanel a jury that could
implement the national community standard.8 This further neutralizes
opposition to the court taking jurisdiction in these cases. One standard would
then apply to all imports instead of a variety of community standards
applying in each separate district of importation."
76. See H.R. 6394, 96th CONG., 2d SEss. § 201 (1980). The earlier House Bill stated
that the court had jurisdiction of any civil action arising under an import transaction,
conceivably including embargoes to protect public health and safety which were not
excluded from the jurisdiction of the court. Id. This earlier version of Subsection (i) (the
broad grant in Section 1581) could have been interpreted to permit the court to assert
jurisdiction over civil actions involving such cases. H.R. REP. No. 1235, 96th CONG., 2d
SESS. 47-48 (1980).
77. The appropriate standard for imports is a national standard rather than a
local community standard. The Court of International Trade would be more capable
than the district courts of applying such a national standard. That consideration, along
with the new ability of the court to conduct jury trials, made many who testified before
the House Committee on the Judiciary question why these trials should not be in the
Court of International Trade. See, e.g., Customs Courts Act of 1980: Hearings on HIR.
6394 Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the Comm. on the
Judiciary, 96th CONG., 2d SESS. 205, 214, 228 (1980) (remarks of Leonard Lehman on
behalf of the American Bar Association, Andrew P. Vance on behalf of the Association
of the Customs Bar, and the Honorable Howard Thomas Markey, Chief Judge of the
United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals).
78. Customs Courts Act, supra note 5, at 1739 (to be codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1876).
The method to be used in conducting jury trials in the Court of International Trade
duplicates district court procedures: the selection, qualification challenge, and com-
pensation of jurors is identical in the district courts and in the Court of International
Trade. The Act further states that "the clerk of the district court shall act as clerk of
the Court of International Trade for purposes of selecting and summoning the jury."
79. Cf., Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 104 (1976) (the test in district
courts is the average person applying contemporary community standards).
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These express exclusions destroy clear demarcation of jurisdiction
between the Court of International Trade and the district courts since not all
actions arising out of import legislation are within the court's exclusive
jurisdiction. Instead of formulating an all-inclusive standard, Congress
enacted a half-way measure that deviated from its original intent of having
an integral system of review.
A persuasive argument in favor of giving the court exclusive jurisdiction
emphasizes the Court of International Trade's developed expertise over
import legislation and the nation's trade policy. The court is the most logical
forum in which to promote a consistent international trade policy. The court
more readily understands the degree to which Congress will pursue free
trade or protectionist policies due to its familiarity with Congressional
pronouncements in other statutes. The court is also less susceptible to local
influences and is more capable of promoting a national trade policy. A
coherent national trade policy is becoming more important as imports and
exports exert substantial influence on the national economy. Comprehending
the importance of imports and international trade, the court better antici-
pates the impact of its decisions and appropriately shapes its decisions to
meet national trade goals.
Congress was somewhat more successful in pursuing its goals of
consistency and clarity in the Act's second broad grant of jurisdiction. This
grant gave the court jurisdiction over all actions commenced prior to
importation that request review over rulings1° by the Secretary of the
Treasury relating to various duties and agency actions.8' The court, however,
80. The language requires review of a ruling or a refusal to issue or change a
ruling "relating to classification, valuation, rate of duty, marking, restricted merchan-
dise, entry requirements, drawbacks, vessel repairs or similar matters." Customs
Courts Act, supra note 5, at 1729 (to be codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1581(h)).
The word "ruling" is defined as a determination by the Secretary of the Treas-
ury as to the manner in which it will treat the contemplated transaction. "Ruling" does
not include internal advice or a request for further review, both of which relate to
completed import transaction. H.R. REP. No. 1235, 96th CONG., 2d SEss. 46 (1980).
81. Customs Courts Act, supra note 5, at 1929 (to be codified in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1581(h)). The Subsection states:
(h) The Court of International Trade shall have exclusive jurisdiction of any civil
action commenced to review, prior to the importation of the goods involved, a
ruling issued by the Secretary of the Treasury, or a refusal to issue or change such
a ruling, relating to classification, valuation, rate or duty, marking, restricted
merchandise, entry requirements, drawbacks, vessel repairs, or similar matters,
but only if the party commencing the civil action demonstrates to the court that
he would be irreparably harmed unless given an opportunity to obtain judicial
review prior to such importation.
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must otherwise have jurisdiction over the main action before it grants review
over such preliminary action.2
This grant of jurisdiction is intended to eliminate the inadequate remedy
exception that had caused the bulk of conflicting case law governing
jurisdiction. Although plaintiffs under the Act do not generally have to suffer
the risk of importation, the court will not grant review prior to importation
in every case.83 The plaintiff must demonstrate that he would be "irreparably
harmed" if denied review prior to importation," and "irreparably harmed" is
not liberally defined.
According to the legislative history, a plaintiff who finds it would be
financially or commercially impracticable to import the goods, pay duties,
protest, and then seek judicial review would be "irreparably harmed" if
unable to obtain judicial review in a manner that did not require such a
procedure as a precondition to judicial review. Congress uses the term
"commercial impracticability" to refer to cases where the demand for goods is
seasonal, thereby necessitating immediate importation. 5 Congress intended
this exception to be narrowly construed and granted only in limited
circumstances. Otherwise, the statutory scheme of express grants of jurisdic-
tion would be nullified." If unable to make the necessary showing of
irreparable injury, the plaintiff must follow the statutory procedures
requiring importation of the goods and then seek redress under one of the
express grants of jurisdiction.
82. This additional requirement for review which is not expressed in the language
of the statute, demands that the ruling relate to subject matter already within the
jurisdiction of the court. See H.R. REP. No. 96-1235, 96th CoNG., 2d SEss. 46 (1980); S.
REP. No. 96-466, 96th CONG., 1stSESS. 11 (1979). This grant is also subject to the
express exclusions of the other broad grant, but this grant of jurisdiction does not con-
tain any other exclusions peculiar to review prior to importation.
83. Although many individuals will desire to obtain judicial review without the
payment of duties, such review is exceptional and authorized only if the requirement of
the Section, a showing of irreparable harm, is met. H.R. REP. No. 1235, 96th CONG., 2d
SESS. 47 (1980).
84. See supra note 81.
85. S. REP. No. 466, 96th CONG., 1st SESS. 11-12 (197-q.
86. If a remedy is available under the statute, the plaintiff must use that remedy
unless he would be irreparably harmed by following that statutory procedure. Only
then, may the plaintiff obtain review prior to importation. Both the House of Repre-
sentatives and the Senate in their reports on the Customs Courts Act stated that the
intent was to have a very narrow exception to the general rule requiring an importer to
follow statutory procedures. A broad interpretation would nullify those procedures,
contrary to the intent of the enacters. H.R. REP. No. 1235, 96th CONG., 2d SEss. 46
(1980); S. REP. No. 466, 96th CONG., 1st SESS. 12 (1979).
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The court should use its powers, expand its jurisdiction over actions
commenced prior to importation, and not strictly confine review prior to
importation only to cases of extreme commercial impracticability. It should
grant review of those cases previously reviewed by the district courts under
the inadequate remedy exception. The legislative history supports this
interpretation of the court's jurisdiction."
The court should use its broad grant of jurisdiction to achieve Congres-
sional goals of clarity and consistency. It can take jurisdiction over any case
involving imports in order to prevent the district courts from asserting their
jurisdiction. Where other legislative history is not clear, the intent of
consistency should prevail, and the Court of International Trade should
exercise jurisdiction.
B. ACCESS TO THE COURT
After resolving the jurisdictional conflicts by vesting jurisdiction in the
Court of International Trade, Congress reformed the narrow standing
provisions in trade legislation that had previously prevented access to
judicial review. Congress intended that those persons adversely affected by
agency action be afforded greater access to judicial review." Accordingly,
Congress expanded the right to judicial review88 by making the right of those
persons aggrieved by agency action concerning imports identical to the right
of those aggrieved by other similar agency actions.'
Two defects existed in the former, more narrow standing provisions. The
first was in the strict technical requirements that had to be met before
review was granted." The second was in the statutory definition of persons
eligible to seek review in the courts. 2
87, The House Reports cite those cases in which the district courts took jurisdic-
tion under the inadequate remedy exception and specify that the transfer to the Court
of International Trade is intended to authorize the Court of International Trade to take
those cases. H.R. REP. No. 1235, 96th CONG., 2d SESS. 29-30 (1980).
88. H.R. REP. No. 1235, 96th CONG., 2d SEss. 22 (1980).
89. See Customs Courts Act, supra note 5, at 1730-32 (to be codified in 28 U.S.C.
§ 2631).
90. Commentators had criticized the Tariff Act of 1930 and the Trade Agreements
Act of 1979 because these Acts did not provide the same judicial review to those per-
sons and domestic associations aggrieved by agency actions pertaining to importation
as Congress has provided for persons and associations aggrieved by other agency ac-
tions. Customs Courts Act of 1979: Hearing on S. 1654 Before the Subcomm. on Im-
provements in Judicial Machinery of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th CONG., 1st SEss.
3 (1979).
91. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 300 (1979).
92. Id.
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The defect of strict technical procedure was easily remedied by allowing
importers to seek review without following the burdensome statutory steps of
importation; assessment of duties; payment of duties; protest of duties; denial
of protest; and finally, review in the Customs Court.93
The second defect - the definition of the right to action - was found in
the Tariff Act of 1930 and in the Trade Act of 1974, both of which restricted
the class of persons eligible to bring an action. The Trade Agreements Act of
1979, in its amendments to the Tariff Act of 1930, somewhat enlarged the
class of individuals entitled to bring an action,' but defects still remained.
Prior to the amendments, only an American manufacturer, producer, or
wholesaler could petition the court for review of the imposition of duties. 5
The Trade Agreements Act amendments added the following classes to those
already having standing: certified or recognized unions working in an
industry engaged in the production of a product that is the subject matter of
the suit; and a domestic trade or business association, a majority of whose
members manufacture, produce, or sell a like product that is the subject of
the suit.9 However, the Trade Agreements Act did not extend standing to
foreign trade associations or to foreign governments97 (nor did the Customs
Courts Act of 1980)."8
93. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
94. The Trade Agreements Acts sets forth those particular "interested parties"
which may seek review:
(1) a foreign manufacturer, producer, or exporter, or the United States importer, of
merchandise which is the subject of an investigation under this subtitle; or
(2) a manufacturer, producer, or wholesaler in the United States of a like product;
or
(3) a certified union or recognized union, or group of workers which is representa-
tive of an industry engaged in the manufacture, production, or wholesale in the
United States of a like product; or
(4) a domestic trade or business association, a majority of whose members manu-
facture, produce, or wholesale a like product in the United States.
Trade Agreements Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1516a(d), (f), 1671a(b)(1), 1673a(b)(1), 1675(b),
1677(a) (Supp. I1 1979). The above list summarizes the statutory definitions of those
interested parties entitled to bring an action.
95. See Trade Act of 1930, ch. 497, § 516, 46 Stat. 735 (1980) (amended by Trade
Agreements Act of 1979, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1516, 1516a (Supp. III 1979)).
96. See supra note 94.
97. The only persons entitled to seek review in the court under the Trade Agree-
ments Act were those party to the prior proceeding, that is, those parties entitled to
initiate the proceeding or those parties who were the subject of the proceeding. Because
domestic interested parties initiated a proceeding only against foreign importers, fore-
ign governments and foreign trade associations were never proper parties to the pro-
ceeding. See supra note 94.
98. That Act simply restates the standing rule under Section 516a of the Tariff
Act, being the same as the Trade Agreements Act: "Any action may be commenced by
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In contrast to the exclusion of foreign trade associations from review in
the court, Congress did recognize that domestic trade associations do have
judicially-recognized interests in the outcome of litigation affecting an item
produced by members of such associations. This is an arbitrary distinction.
The interests of foreign trade associations do not differ in a manner
significant enough to justify their total exclusion from the court while the
same domestic concerns may enter court in a like action.
It might be suggested that the proper procedure for these foreign trade
associations would be to present their claims through diplomatic channels,
but this argument ignores the basis of the importers' protest. They contest
the administrative imposition of a duty on their goods - not the law
providing the legal basis for the duty. It is not the policy that foreign trade
associations challenge but the specific administrative imposition of a duty
which, if left unchallenged, will establish precedent for levying the same
duty on all goods of that kind. It is ludicrous to suggest that these foreign
trade associations are not aggrieved by such agency action and that they
should not be given the right to judicial review.
This anomalous distinction in the Trade Agreements Act and Customs
Courts Act demonstrates Congress' approach to reform. Since the need to
grant standing to foreign trade associations did not present a direct problem
for its own constituencies, Congress did not acknowledge that this narrow
view of standing defeated its goal of providing judicial review to those
persons aggrieved by agency action to the same extent as provided in other
courts for persons aggrieved by other agency actions.
An organization is usually qualified to bring an action in a representa-
tive capacity if its individual members would have standing to bring suit
under Section 702 of the Administrative Procedure Act." A foreign trade
association certainly represents members who are injured by agency action
that hinders the importation of goods by the group. The individual members
any interested party who was a party to the proceeding in which the matter arose."
This restatement of the law from the prior Acts excludes foreign import associations.
Customs Courts Act, supra note 5 at 1730 (to be codified in 28 U.S.C. § 2631(c)).
99. Public Citizen v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 565 F.2d 708 (D.C. Cir. 1977). An
organization whose members are injured may represent those members in a proceeding
for judicial review under Section 702 of the Administrative Procedure Act. Id. See also
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
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(importers) of the group do have standing under Section 702 of the
Administrative Procedure Act."
This limitation on the definition of persons aggrieved by agency action
contradicts Subsection (i) of the standing section of the Customs Courts Act,
which permits any person adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action,
within the meaning of section 702 of the Administrative Procedure Act,"1 to
commence an action."°2 On its face, this definition seems to include foreign
trade associations within those persons eligible to seek review, but a
qualification to the definition prevents it from governing actions brought
under the Trade Agreements Act."3 The result is that foreign import
associations do not have standing to contest the amount of duties levied on
their members - a conclusion confirmed by a recent decision of the court. °4
Although the law excluding foreign trade associations remained the
same under the Customs Courts Act, this Act did expand the standing of
domestic interest groups to include groups such as the Consumers' Union. 5
100. For a plaintiff to have standing, the plaintiff must allege injury within the
zone of interests protected by the statute in question. Foreign importers definitely fit
this qualification: they are injured by the imposition of antidumping and countervail-
ing duties that are within the zone of interest regulated by the statute. See Starbrick v.
San Francisco, 556 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1977); Concerned Residents of Buck Hill Falls v.
Grant, 537 F.2d 201 (3d Cir. 1976).
101. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976). The statute states: "A
person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or
aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to
judicial review thereof."
102. Customs Courts Act, supra note 5, at 1731 (to be codified in 28 U.S.C.
§ 2631(i)).
103. Subsection (i) only applies to a civil action not already covered in any other
subsection, one particular subsection being the definition of standing for actions com-
menced under the Trade Agreements Act. See supra notes 94 & 97.
104. In Armco, Inc. v. United States, No. 81-10 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1981), reprinted in
CusT. B. & DEC. No. 7 (February 18, 1981), the court held that the foreign producers
and exporters of steel were interested parties and properly before the court, but denied
standing to the foreign business association and stated: [N]o provision has been made
in the statute for inclusion of foreign business associations within the definition of
interested parties, as has been done in the statute with respect to business associations
of domestic manufacturers, producers, and even importers.
105. Consumers Union brought many actions contesting agency action in the past.
To qualify for standing in the courts, the group used a variety of methods and did not
rely on its status as a group representing individuals affected by agency action. See,
e.g., Consumers Union v. The Committee for the Implementation of Textile Agree-
ments, 561 F.2d 872 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 933 (1978) (plaintiff itself
bought textile merchandise for testing purposes and was thereby injured); cf. Consum-
ers Union v. Rogers, 352 F. Supp. 319 (D.D.C. 1973) (action brought under Sherman
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In the past, Courts had denied standing to these interest groups because they
were not a domestic manufacturer, producer, wholesaler, or trade association.
These groups may now seek review in the Court of International Trade under
the Act's standing provision, which incorporates the broad definition of
aggrieved person from the Administrative Procedure Act and the broad
jurisdictional grant in the Act itself. 1
For example, if import restraints on textiles are increased through the
use of quotas, Consumers' Union or any other interested group may bring an
action to object to the decreased number of goods that will enter the United
States. Consumers' Union would represent individual consumers who would
be injured by any reduction in available textiles and the consequent increase
in prices. The desire of these groups to present their views on trade policy
was well-known to Congress, which facilitated their receipt of favorable
reform attention.
Finally, the Customs Courts Act of 1980 expanded standing in those
actions commenced under the Trade Act of 1974. Previously, only workers
could bring suit, °7 but now workers, firms and communities may challenge
adverse agency action in the Court of International Trade.'1 All parties
eligible to receive assistance under the Trade Act of 1974 may now seek
judicial review of adverse agency determinations,"° due to the Customs
Courts Act's definition of aggrieved person, which is similar to that of the
definition in the Administrative Procedures Act.
Antitrust Act), modified sub nom., Consumers Union, Inc. v. Kissinger, 406 F.2d 136
(D.C. Cir. 1974) (action was brought under Trade Expansion Act of 1962, which recog-
nized such affects on domestic interests - this provision was later repealed by the
Trade Act of 1974, which contained a more restrictive view of standing), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 1004 (1975); Consumers Union v. Butz, No. 2142-72 (D.D.C. September 6,
1973) (Consumers Union is not a manufacturer, producer, wholesaler, union, group of
workers, or a trade or business association of producers or wholesalers - as required
for standing).
106. H.R. REP. No. 96-1235, 96th CONG., 2d SEss. 52 (1980) (catch-all standing
section meant to correlate with catch-all jurisdictional section).
107. Trade Act of 1974, tit. II, § 205, 88 Stat. 2029 (1975) (repealed by Customs
Courts Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-417, § 612, 94 Stat. 1746).
108. Customs Courts Act, supra note 5, at 1730-31 (to be codified in 28 U.S.C.
§ 2631(d)). Firms and communities sue the Secretary of Commerce, and workers sue
the Secretary of Labor.
109. The determinations made by pertinent agencies that are subject to review are
as follows: (1) The Secretary of Labor certifies workers as eligible to receive assistance
to compensate for injury from import competition; and (2) The Secretary of Commerce
certifies firms and communities similarly injured as a result of import competition.
Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2273, 2341, 2371 (1976).
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Political pressures influenced Congress to expand the standing provision
to include all of the domestic entities, workers, firms and communities that
could be injured by import competition and therefore be eligible under the
Trade Act for relief assistance. Because of Congressional trade policies that
liberalized international trade and reduced trade barriers in the United
States, domestic concerns demanded increased relief and fairer administra-
tion of that relief. Congress provided import relief in the Trade Act of 1974,
but it left implementation and disbursement of that relief entirely to the
administering agencies without providing for judicial review over such
agency action to ensure just administration of the import assistance program
(except for agency action on workers). The Customs Courts Act reflects the
goal of Congress that those workers, firms and communities eligible for
assistance have the right of judicial review if the agency action adversely
affects their interests.
This intense concern over the impact of foreign trade only on the
domestic economy is evidenced by the narrow standing provision of the Trade
Agreements Act - a provision continued in the Customs Courts Act, which
excludes foreign trade associations. Domestic interests are more capable of
persuading Congress that they have a right to be heard in court than foreign
interests which, unless they are the subject of a proceeding, do not suffer a
reviewable harm as defined by the law. It is difficult to rationalize the
distinction made by Congress between foreign import associations aggrieved
by agency action and aggrieved domestic interest groups, except to recognize
the great political pressures that domestic interests can bring to bear as
compared with the negligible pressures brought by foreign interests. This
result contravenes the Congressional objective of granting judicial review to
all parties aggrieved by agency action.
C. RELIEF AVAILABLE
Before the Customs Courts Act of 1980 became law, the Customs Court
could only render decisions and express its opinion as to what it thought was
the proper outcome of a case."' The court could not enter money judgments or
110. Under the prior law, if the court decided a case for an importer, the court
returned the case to the Customs Service with an order that the duty be reassessed in
accordance with its decision. The Customs Service would then issue the refund. Now,
the Court may simply enter a judgment for the amount to be refunded, and the judg-
ment is to be paid in the same manner as any other judgment against the United
States. H.R. REP. No. 1235, 96th CONG., 2d SEss. 60 (1980); cf. Mego Corp. v. United
States, 73 Cust. Ct. 190 (1974) (illustrates lack of authority in denial of higher rate of
duty for government).
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issue injunctions; it could only return a case to the administering agency,
along with its decision and hope that the agency would voluntarily
implement the decision of the court - a very ineffective system by which to
compel agency compliance."'
The Customs Court Act gave the court the power to enter money
judgments against recalcitrant importers who refused to pay duties and
against the U.S. government when it refrained from refunding overpaid
duties."' To encourage the expeditious refund of overpaid duties, the court
now has the additional power to award interest on its money judgments."3
Thus, the court may now enforce its decisions and compel agencies to adhere
to public policy as expressed in legislation interpreted by the court.
There was still another defect in the court's power prior to the passage of
the Customs Courts Act of 1980. The court lacked all power in equity,",
except as meagerly granted under the Trade Agreements Act of 1979."1 The
Trade Agreements Act anticipated the later adoption of the Customs Courts
Act of 1980 by granting the court limited equity powers. However, under the
Trade Agreements Act, the court could only enjoin the assessment of
anti-dumping duties and countervailing duties imposed by the Secretary of
the Treasury or the administering authority. This limited injunctive relief
(the only equitable relief available in the Customs Court) required the
111. The Customs Court could not compel agency action because it lacked the equit-
able power necessary to order certain agency action. Gehart, Judicial Review of Cus-
toms Service Actions, 9 LAW POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1101, 1159 (1977).
112. Customs Courts Act, supra note 5, at 1737 (to be codified in 28 U.S.C. § 2643).
These judgments may be registered in any judicial district, and if so registered, they
shall have the same effect as a judgment of the district court of the district where
registered. Customs Courts*Act, supra note 5, at 1743 (to be codified in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1963A).
113. Customs Courts Act, supra note 5, at 1738 (to be codified in 28 U.S.C. § 2644).
One of the reasons offered to explain the tardiness of Customs Service's actions on
refunds was that they did not pay interest on refunds and did not have that extra
incentive to hastily process refunds. S. REsP. No. 466, 96th CONG., 1st SESS. 20 (1980).
See Customs Courts Act of 1980: Hearings on HR. 6394 before the Subcomm. on Mono-
polies and Commercial Law of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th CONG., 2d SESS. 126,
129 (1980).
114. See Gehart, Judicial Review of Customs Service Actions, 9 LAW & POL'Y INT'L
Bus. 1101, 1142 (1977). See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Dep't of the Treasury,
67 Cust. Ct. 328 (1971), affd, 485 F.2d 1402 (C.C.P.A.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 21 (1973)
(Customs Court admitted its lack of equity power and refused to invoke the All Writs
Act).
115. Trade Agreements Act. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(4)(c)(2) (Supp. III 1979).
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satisfaction of criteria explicitly enunciated in the statute. '16 Because of the
limited relief available in the Customs Court, plaintiffs preferred to bring
suit in the district court where there was a broader range of available
remedies."'
The Customs Courts Act of 1980 expanded the available remedies and
granted the Court of International Trade "all the powers in law and equity of,
or as conferred by statute upon, a district court . . .'"' The court is now
capable of granting full equitable relief;" 9 however, not all forms of relief are
available in every action under all the trade laws. Some limitations on the
court's equitable powers remain in the Act in those actions commenced under
the Trade Act of 1974 and in those actions commenced prior to importation."
In actions commenced to review final determinations made under the
Trade Act of 1974, the court may not grant an injunction or issue a writ of
116. The four criteria set forth in the Trade Agreements Act that the court must
consider before granting injunctive relief under that statute are as follows:
(A) the party filing the action is likely to prevail on the merits;
(B) the party filing the action would be irreparably harmed if liquidation of some
or all of the entries is not enjoined;
(C) the public interest would best be served if liquidation is enjoined; and
(D) the harm to the party filing the action would be greater if liquidation of some
or all of the entries is not enjoined than the harm to other persons if liquidation of
some or all of the entries is enjoined.
Trade Agreements Act, 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(4)(C)(2)(A)-(D) (Supp. I1 1979). Liquida-
tion of entries means levying or imposing the duty on the imported goods.
117. See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
118. Customs Courts Act, supra note 5, at 1730 (to be codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1585).
The court has used its equitable powers, but seems more incliped to deny relief. The
court clearly considers injunctive relief extraordinary and available only in special
circumstances. Cf., S.J. Style Assocs., Ltd. v. Snyder, No. 81-12 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1981),
reprinted in 15 CUST. B. & DEc. No. 6 (Feb. 11, 1981) (denied relief); Haarman &
Reimer Corp. v. United States, No. 81-13 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1981), reprinted in 15 CusT.
B. & DEC. No. 15 (March 4, 1981) (denied relief); Wear Me Apparel Corp. v. United
States, No, 80-13 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1980), reprinted in 15 CUST. B. & DEC. No. 2 (Jan. 14,
1981) (denied relief); Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, No. 80-10 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1980), reprinted in 15 CUST. B. & DEc. No. 1 (Jan. 7,1981) (granted preliminary injunc-
tion); Di Jub Leasing Corp. v. United States, No. 80-9 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1980), reprinted
in 14 CusT. B. & DEC. No. 15 (Dec. 31, 1980) (denied relief).
119. The Act lists the forms of relief the court may grant, noting that the list is not
exclusive, nor does it apply in every action. The list includes declaratory judgments,
orders of remand, injunctions, writs of mandamus and prohibitions. Customs Courts
Act, supra note 5, at 1738 (to be codified in 28 U.S.C. § 2643(c)(1)).
120. Customs Courts Act, supra note 5, at 1738 (to be codified in 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2643(c)(2), 2643(c)(4)).
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mandamus. Declaratory judgments and orders of remand, however, are
permissible remedies.'2 ' The legislative history does not explain why some
remedies are permissible while others are not, but the Act reflects a belief
that the court should not unduly interfere with the agency decision-making
process. The court may not require an agency to make a specific decision on
whether a worker, firm or community is eligible to apply for assistance. The
decision on eligibility is within the discretion of the Secretaries of Labor and
Commerce. Review follows only after a final determination of assistance, and
not after preliminary determination of eligibility.'
Full equitable relief in actions commenced prior to importation was also
denied by Congress, which only authorized declaratory relief. The agency
process must be completed, and the final decision to grant assistance or
impose a duty must be rendered, before the court may enter with its full
equitable powers.'"
Although very little legislative history exists to explain Congress'
rationale for restricting the court's equitable powers, ample legislative
history does exist to define the appropriate standards for the court to follow
in applying the new equitable powers it has been granted. It is the express
intent of Congress that the Court of International Trade consider the same
factors a district court considers when granting similar relief.2 4 The Customs
Courts Act does not contain a checklist of the factors the court must
consider. 2' However, a listing does remain in the Trade Agreements Act of
121. Customs Courts Act, supra note 5, at 1738 (to be codified in 28 U.S.C.
§ 2643(c)(2)).
122. Customs Courts Act, supra note 5, at 1738 (to be codified in 28 U.S.C.
§ 2643(c)(4)).
123. Customs Courts Act, supra note 5, at 1738 (to be codified in 28 U.S.C.
§ 2643(c)(4)).
124. Congressional intent was that the authorization of equitable powers be
deemed to grant the court powers coextensive with the powers of the federal district
courts and that the court be guided by the same factors utilized by a federal district
court when considering a request for permanent or injunctive relief. This intent ex-
tends logically to all forms of equitable relief. H.R. REP. No. 1235, 96th CONG., 2d SESS.
61 (1980). Cf., Customs Courts Act of 1979 Hearing on S. 1654 Before the Subcomm. on
Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th CONG., 1st
SEss. 19 (1979) (representative of the Department of Justice confident that the Court of
International Trade will utilize standards already developed by the district courts).
125. The earliest Senate bill required that before the court could grant preliminary
injunctive relief, the court had to determine that the plaintiff would suffer substantial
irreparable injury if denied relief and that the public interest would be served by
granting such relief. S. 2857, 95th CONG., 2d SESS. § 402 (1979) (contained in section
entitled "Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies").
Compare this lack of specific enumeration of factors in the Customs Courts Act
of 1980 to the list in the Trade Agreements Act. See supra note 116.
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1979 and it still governs those actions challenging the assessment of
anti-dumping or countervailing duties.' In other cases in which plaintiffs
have demanded equitable relief, the court has referred to the four factors
developed by the district courts to aid it in deciding the appropriate relief.
5
'
The critical factor preventing most plaintiffs from obtaining relief, however,
is their inability to demonstrate irreparable injury. The court has held that a
showing of increased costs does not suffice to meet the necessary requirement
of irreparable injury.2 s
Congress gave the court wide authority to eliminate inequities prevail-
ing under the former laws. In so doing, Congress mandated that if a
plaintiff presented a valid claim, the court should award the plaintiff the
appropriate relief - whether it be a money judgment or equitable relief.
126. The Court of International Trade retains jurisdiction over these actions, and
although an early Senate bill expressly amended the Trade Agreements Act to conform
to the nonenumerated factors in the bill, the present Act does not so amend the Trade
Agreements Act. See Customs Courts Act, supra note 5, at 1728 (to be codified at 28
U.S.C. § 1581(c)) (section granting jurisdiction to the court over civil actions under the
Trade Agreements Act); S. 1654, 96th CONG., 1st SEss. § 613 (1979) (Senate bill ex-
pressly amending the Trade Agreements Act).
127. The court refers to the four factors constituting the criteria as the Virginia
Petroleum/Holiday Tours test. See Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Commission
v. Holiday Tours, Inc., 559 F.2d 841, 843 (D.C. Cir. 1972)); Zenith Radio Corp. v.
United States, No. 80-10 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1980), reprinted in 15 CUST. B. & DEC. No. 1
(Jan. 7, 1981) (citing Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Association v. F.P.C., 259 F.2d 921,
925 (D.C. Cir. 1958)).
The exact criteria used by the courts requires that the plaintiff show the fol-
lowing: (1) there is a substantial likelihood that the plaintiff will suffer irreparable
injury if the injunction is not granted; (2) the threatened injury to the plaintiff out-
weighs the threatened harm that the granting of an injunction might do to the defen-
dants; (3) there is a substantial likelihood that plaintiff will eventually prevail on the
merits; and (4) the public interest would be promoted by granting or denying the in-
junction. Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, No. 80-10 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1980), re-
printed in 15 CUsT. B. & DEC. No. 1 (Jan. 7, 1981). See also supra note 118.
128. In two cases, S. J. Stile Assocs., Ltd. v. Snyder, No. 81-2 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1981),
reprinted in 15 CUST. B. & DEC. No. 15 (Feb. 11, 1981) and Di Jub Leasing v. United
States, No. 80-9 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1980), reprinted in 14 CusT. B. & DEC. No. 15 (Dec. 31,
1981), the court denied relief because of an insufficient showing of irreparable injury.
In S. J. Stile, the court held that the proof of irreparable injury in the form of increased
business costs was minimal, speculative, and in any event, outweighed by the injury
affecting the public interest upon the issue of an injunction. In Di Jub Leasing, the
plaintiff also failed to show sufficient irreparable injury by claiming total loss in busi-
ness volume. Instead, the plaintiff needed to show that the loss in business resulting
from the revocation of a customs' license was absolute and that such business would
not be readily replaced by other business.
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III. CONCLUSION
While Congress provided many needed reforms in the Customs Courts
Act of 1980, it failed to implement the needed widesweeping reforms in the
judicial review of import transactions. The pressing need for reforms that
existed at the time the bill was drafted prompted these halfway measures.
Due to Congress' desire to pass some type of reform legislation as rapidly as
possible, the more expansive goals of Congress were compromised in the
process of pushing this Act quickly into law."9
In defining the valid claims to which the full authority of the court would
attach, Congress only recognized recurring fact patterns, representative of
certain well-documented injustices presented to them, and did not thoroughly
explore the possible injustices likely to occur in the future. Congress did not
creatively approach this reform and failed to provide the optimal system of
judicial review. A truly effective system would apply to all import transac-
tions consistent with Congressional goals of uniformity, increased access, and
expanded relief.
Congress sought to establish a comprehensive system of judicial review
over all actions arising under trade legislation; however, opposing policies
surfaced to defeat these intentions in the Act - despite the great advantages
of such a system in terms of simplicity and consistency. The Act's exceptions
to the complete grant of jurisdiction to the court destroyed the concept of a
complete system of review.
In addition, Congress neglected to follow its original objective of assuring
that access to the Court of International Trade would be similar to access to
other courts reviewing similar agency actions. The Customs Courts Act failed
to duplicate the definition of standing as contained in the Administrative
Procedure Act." Whether it was due to oversight or opposition by domestic
interests opposed to any greater protection for foreign interests, the Act
failed to fulfill this goal.
The final powers granted to the court also disregarded the Congressional
goal of making the relief available in the Court of International Trade
129. The pressing need for this bill encouraged Congress to pass a bill to reform the
jurisdiction of the Customs Court as soon as possible. The overriding desire was to pass
a complete bill as expeditiously as possible and to eliminate or modify any disagree-
ments barring that end. Customs Courts Act: Hearing on S. 2857 Before the Subcomm.
on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th CONG., 2d
SFss. 76 (1978) (remarks of Senator DeConcini). See, e.g., 126 CONG. REC. S13345 (daily
ed. Sept. 24, 1980) (remarks of Senator DeConcini seeking to avoid a time-consuming
conference).
130. Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976). See supra note 101.
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similar to that available in the district courts. The Act granted circumscribed
equitable powers to the court that compare unfavorably to the full powers of
the district courts.
The shortcomings of the Act, when compared to the broad, original
Congressional goals, were caused by Congress' traditional approach to the
reform of trade legislation; that is, undertaking reform only as absolutely
necessary on an ad hoc basis, instead of enacting comprehensive and
prospective reform. Issues undiscovered or insufficiently emphasized have
been left for later legislation. The harsh results - caused by the lack of
congressional foresight - could have been prevented by more creative
legislation. Congress should have taken a more aggressive approach to
reform, anticipated injustices in the system of judicial review, and reformed
on a more comprehensive basis.
Broad reform is as important to Congress as it is to those individuals
who suffer from an inequitable system of review. Defects in judicial review of
import transactions cause ineffective oversight in the implementation of
Congressional policy as established through legislation. The actual policies
being implemented by the agencies will not remain consistently in agree-
ment with Congressional intent if judicial review ineffectively monitors
agency action. The need to ensure correct implementation of Congressional
trade policy justifies wider reform of the system of review. Congress'
overriding goal has been to reduce trade barriers, but not to such an extent
as to unduly harm domestic interests. Once Congress correctly translates into
legislation the balance desired between free trade and protection of U.S.
industry, Congress will have established a workable framework through
which the agencies may implement the achievement of Congressional goals.
Jane Lynn Stafford*
* B.A. (Economics), Vanderbilt University; J.D. (expected), The American Uni-
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